On political questions, many people prefer to consult and learn from those whose political views are similar to their own, thus creating a risk of echo chambers or information cocoons. We test whether the tendency to prefer knowledge from the politically like-minded generalizes to domains that have nothing to do with politics, even when evidence indicates that politically like-minded people are less skilled in those domains than people with dissimilar political views. Participants had multiple opportunities to learn about others' (1) political opinions and (2) ability to categorize geometric shapes. They then decided to whom to turn for advice when solving an incentivized shape categorization task. We find that participants falsely concluded that politically like-minded others were better at categorizing shapes and thus chose to hear from them. Participants were also more influenced by politically like-minded others, even when they had good reason not to be. These results replicate in two independent samples. The findings demonstrate that knowing about others' political views interferes with the ability to learn about their competency in unrelated tasks, leading to suboptimal information-seeking decisions and errors in judgement. Our findings have implications for political polarization and social learning in the midst of political divisions. ⁎ Corresponding authors.
Introduction
To make good choices, human beings turn to one another for information (Gino, Brooks, & Schweitzer, 2012; Hofmann, Lei, & Grant, 2009; Schrah, Dalal, & Sniezek, 2006; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000) . When selecting a retirement plan or deciding whether to grab an umbrella on the way out, people are motivated to get information from the most accurate source. Obviously, people would prefer to receive a weather report from the weather forecaster whose predictions are 80% correct than from the one who is wrong every other day.
At the same time, people also prefer to receive information from others who are similar to themselves. Democrats are more likely to turn to CNN for their news and Republicans to Fox News for their daily updates (The Pew Research Center, 2009 ). This is partly because people assume that like-minded people are more likely to be correct -a phenomenon that can lead to echo chambers (Del Vicario et al., 2016; Sunstein, 2017) . But if people had clear and repeated opportunities to learn who is right and who is wrong, would similarity interfere with the ability to learn about accuracy?
It has been suggested that people assess others' expertise based on their own beliefs (Boorman, O'Doherty, Adolphs, & Rangel, 2013; Faraji-Rad, Warlop, & Samuelsen, 2012; Faraji-Rad, Samuelsen, & Warlop, 2015; Schilbach, Eickhoff, Schultze, Mojzisch, & Vogeley, 2013) . In one study (Boorman et al., 2013) participants were asked to evaluate financial assets while also observing the judgments made by others before receiving feedback. The findings indicated that participants updated their beliefs about others' expertise not only after receiving feedback about the asset's value, but also before feedback was available. In particular, participants took into account their own judgment about the asset when updating their assessment of the other participant's ability on the task. When the other person's judgment was in accord with their own, they gave the other person credit, but they penalized that person when their judgments conflicted. In fact, subjects gave considerable credit to people for correct judgements with which they agreed, but barely gave them any credit at all for accurate judgments with which they disagreed. This bias interferes with the ability to assess others' skills, leading individuals to conclude that people who think like them about a certain topic are more likely to be experts. Our question, however, is whether similarity in one field will generalize to a biased assessment in another field -a kind of epistemic https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.10.003 Received 13 April 2018; Received in revised form 4 October 2018; Accepted 5 October 2018
